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Notes
Why Familial Searches of Civilian DNA Databases
Can and Should Survive Carpenter
JASPER FORD-MONROE†
Over the past few years, a powerful new forensic technique has emerged. By uploading DNA from
a crime scene to a civilian DNA database, such as GEDmatch, investigators can discover the
genetic relatives of the perpetrator and thereby track down the perpetrator himself. This
procedure is known as forensic genetic genealogy searching (FGGS), and in under three years it
has cracked numerous decades-old cases once thought to be unsolvable.
Concerned about genetic privacy and discrimination, most legal commentators have thus far
confronted FGGS with raised hackles. They either argue FGGS is a Fourth Amendment search
under Carpenter, or that it escapes Carpenter but ought to be severely restricted or prohibited by
statute.
This Note attempts to show both that FGGS is not a Fourth Amendment search under Carpenter,
and that public policy supports its use to the fullest practicable extent. On the doctrinal side,
FGGS is distinguishable on every point from the location information at issue in Carpenter. On
the practical side, FGGS is of immense forensic value, and the existence of sensible regulatory
restrictions should serve to assuage popular fears.

† J.D. 2021, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The Author would like to thank
Professor Binyamin Blum and Oliver Hamilton, as well as the rest of the HLJ team.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the United States Supreme Court revised the third-party doctrine in
its 2018 Carpenter v. United States1 decision, many commentators have
speculated about whether the decision applies to other kinds of emerging
technology.2 One such technology is the civilian DNA database. Such databases
now boast millions of users who have submitted their DNA.3
Law enforcement in some states has recently begun to use one of these
databases, GEDmatch, to conduct familial searches for unidentified offenders.4
The technique of conducting familial searches through civilian databases has no
universally agreed-upon name at present. This Note will use the Department of
Justice’s term, “forensic genetic genealogical DNA analysis and searching,” or
“FGGS.”5
Up until now, commentators have argued that FGGS can or should be
analogized to the location data collection in Carpenter.6 For example, they have
suggested the high volume of data inherent in a person’s DNA profile is
analogous to the high volume of location data involved in Carpenter.7 They have
also voiced concerns about the sensitive personal information available in DNA,
such as a person’s propensity for genetic-based disease.8
However, DNA only reveals information about a person’s biological being
at time of birth, and cannot shed any light on a person’s actions, associations, or
how they have chosen to live their life more generally.9 By contrast, the location
information at stake in Carpenter reveals a person’s day-to-day actions and

1. Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
2. See, e.g., Eunice Park, Objects, Places and Cyber-Spaces Post-Carpenter: Extending the Third-Party
Doctrine Beyond CSLI: A Consideration of IoT and DNA, 21 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1 (2019); Paul Ohm, The Many
Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J. L. & TECH 357 (2019).
3. Company Facts, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/about-ancestry/company-facts (last
visited July 31, 2021) (over 20 million people in network); About, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about
(last visited July 31, 2021) (more than 12 million testing kits sold).
4. Robert Gearty, DNA, Genetic Genealogy Made 2018 the Year of the Cold Case: “Biggest CrimeFighting Breakthrough in Decades,” FOX NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/us/dna-geneticgenealogy-made-2018-the-year-old-the-cold-case-biggest-crime-fighting-breakthrough-in-decades.
5. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INTERIM POLICY: FORENSIC GENETIC GENEALOGICAL DNA ANALYSIS AND
SEARCHING 1 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/olp/page/file/1204386/download.
6. Compare George M. Dery III, Can a Distant Relative Allow the Government Access to Your DNA? The
Fourth Amendment Implications of Law Enforcement’s Genealogical Search for the Golden State Killer and
Other Genetic Genealogy Investigations, 10 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 103, 121–28 (2019) (Carpenter applies
to FGGS) with Antony Barone Kolenc, “23 and Plea”: Limiting Police Use of Genealogy Sites After Carpenter
v. United States, 122 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 100–01 (2019) (Carpenter does not apply to FGGS, but FGGS should
be restricted by other means), and Alexandra Nieto, Familial Searching: How Implementing Minimum
Safeguards Ensures Constitutionally-Permissible Use of This Powerful Investigative Tool, 40 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1765 (arguing in favor of familial searching, but only briefly mentioning civilian databases and Carpenter).
7. Kolenc, supra note 6, at 97.
8. Id. at 73–74.
9. See, e.g., Ancestry + Traits Service, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/dna-ancestry (last visited
July 31, 2021).
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thereby intrudes into their private affairs.10 The rationale of Carpenter, thus,
does not seem to extend to FGGS.
Likewise, FGGS is distinguishable from a public policy standpoint. The
benefits of its use are enormous, and its nature is such that certain simple
safeguards will minimize the likelihood of abuse. For the foregoing reasons, this
Note expounds on a position contrary to that of the prevailing literature: that
FGGS is not a Fourth Amendment search subject to the warrant requirement,
and public policy supports its status as such.
Part I of this Note reviews the process of FGGS and the ways in which it
is currently regulated. Specifically, Part I reviews the facts and holdings of
Carpenter and the relevant aspects of Maryland v. King, the most recent U.S.
Supreme Court case about DNA identification. Part II applies the rationale of
Carpenter and King to the practice and procedure of FGGS, and concludes that
FGGS, for Fourth Amendment purposes, does not constitute a search. It also
argues that public policy considerations favor the continued use of FGGS. Part
III speculates how FGGS may be performed in the future and offers
recommendations to encourage and expand the safe and effective use of FGGS.

I. BACKGROUND
DNA is a molecule that determines biological traits, found in the cells of
all living things.11 Each person has a different pattern of DNA.12 Because of this
uniqueness, DNA can be used in forensics in much the same way as fingerprints,
and indeed with an even higher rate of success.13 DNA has been so used since
the late 1980s.14
Civilian DNA databases can be divided into two groups: commercial and
open.15 The two largest commercial DNA databases, Ancestry and 23andMe,
have (to date) 20 million and 12 million customers, respectively.16 These sites,
and other “direct-to-customer” databases, work in much the same way. The
customer purchases a DNA collection kit and sends the company a DNA sample,
typically saliva.17 The company then analyzes the customer’s DNA and gives

10. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
11. LEARN.GENETICS, What are DNA and Genes?, https://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/basics/dna. For
more basic scientific background on DNA, see generally LEARN.GENETICS, Basic Genetics,
https://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/basics.
12. LEARN.GENETICS, supra note 11.
13. E.g., John K. Roman, Shannon Reid, Jay Reid, Aaron Chalfin, William Adams & Carly Knight, The
DNA Field Experiment: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of the Use of DNA in the Investigation of High-Volume
Crimes, URBAN INST. 3 (June 16, 2008), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/dna-fieldexperiment/view/full_report.
14. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (ruling on admissibility of
DNA evidence), abrogated by Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1997).
15. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 5, at 3.
16. ANCESTRY, supra note 3.
17. See, e.g., How it Works, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/howitworks/.

August 2021]

FAMILIAL SEARCHES OF CIVILIAN DNA DATABASES

1721

the customer information based on that analysis, including ethnic background,
genetic relations to other users of the service, and genetic traits.18 These include
phenotypic traits, such as eye and hair color, as well as genotypic traits, such as
disease propensities.19
Open DNA databases, by contrast, do not perform their own DNA testing,
but allow users to upload their data from different commercial databases.20 The
most prominent open database is GEDmatch, with over 1.4 million users at last
report.21
FGGS is a process by which law enforcement makes use of these civilian
databases. This Note begins by detailing the current state of FGGS, then moves
to relevant case law, focusing on Carpenter and King.
A. THE CURRENT PRACTICAL AND LEGAL STATE OF FGGS
This Subpart begins by explaining the FGGS process and the fruits of its
use. It then moves on to discuss the current restrictions on FGGS.
1.

FGGS Procedure

FGGS is performed as follows: first, the government contracts with a
vender laboratory to perform the same kind of DNA analysis that a commercial
database would perform.22 Then, the government uploads the resulting profile
into one of the civilian sites.23 Finally, the government uses “traditional
investigative . . . methods” to follow up on any familial matches they discover.24
This process is known more generally as “familial searching”; FGGS refers
specifically to familial searching using civilian databases.25
State governments have conducted familial searches without using civilian
databases since the early 2000s.26 This has been possible because the FBI has
maintained a DNA database in collaboration with state governments nationwide

18. Id.
19. 23ANDME, supra note 9.
20. Kolenc, supra note 6, at 66.
21. GEDMATCH, gedmatch.com (last visited July 31, 2021); Peter Aldhous, A Security Breach Exposed
More Than One Million DNA Profiles on A Major Genealogy Database, BUZZFEED NEWS (July 22, 2020, 3:01
PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/hackers-gedmatch-dna-privacy.
22. DEP’T OF JUST., Department of Justice Announces Interim Policy on Emerging Method to Generate
Leads for Unsolved Violent Crimes (2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announcesinterim-policy-emerging-method-generate-leads-unsolved-violent (last visited July 31, 2021).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Combined
DNA
Index
System,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION
(CODIS),
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis (last visited July 31, 2021).
26. See Richard Willing, Suspects Get Snared by a Relative’s DNA, USA TODAY (June 7, 2005),
Https://Usatoday30.Usatoday.Com/News/Nation/2005-06-07-Dna-Cover_X.Htm (describing a familial search
in North Carolina in 2003).
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called the Combined DNA Index System, or CODIS.27 But the use of civilian
databases has two important functional differences from the use of CODIS. First,
civilian databases use a more advanced type of DNA analysis and contain more
detailed DNA profiles than CODIS, making familial searches easier.28 Second,
civilian databases provide a larger and more diverse corpus of DNA profiles.29
The well-publicized Golden State Killer case serves as an example of
FGGS in practice and its associated benefits. The Golden State Killer’s homicide
spree lasted from 1974 to 1986.30 During that time, he roamed California,
committing approximately forty to fifty rapes and a dozen murders.31 For
decades, the case was cold and the killer remained at large.32 Then, in 2018,
investigators uploaded his DNA profile to GEDmatch.33 They discovered ten to
twenty distant relatives of the killer, approximately third cousins.34 Using those
matches, the investigators were able to find their common ancestor with the
killer and trace the lineage back to the present day.35 They found two possible
candidates, one of whom, Joseph DeAngelo, was confirmed as the killer by a
fresh DNA sample.36
Besides the Golden State Killer, other high-profile cold cases solved by
FGGS include the identification and capture of John D. Miller, who committed
an infamous rape and murder in 1988,37 and William Earl Talbott II, who
committed a double murder in 1987.38 The crimes FGGS has solved go as far
back as the 1970s.39 FGGS has been used to solve recent cases as well. In July

27. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited July.
31, 2021). The following states currently perform familial searching using CODIS: Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Id. By contrast, the federal
government does not. Combined DNA Index System, supra note 25.
28. Natalie Ram, Genetic Privacy After Carpenter, 105 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1378–79 (2019).
29. Kolenc, supra note 6, at 66. Although CODIS contains over 19 million DNA profiles, it is limited to
the profiles of convicts or arrestees, and thus represents only a fraction of the U.S. population. CODIS-NDIS
Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/
ndis-statistics.
30. Justin Jouvenal, To Find Alleged Golden State Killer, Investigators First Found His Great-GreatGrandparents, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2018, 3:22 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/tofind-alleged-golden-state-killer-investigators-first-found-his-great-great-great-grandparents/2018/04/
30/3c865fe7-dfcc-4a0e-b6b2-0bec548d501f_story.html.
31. Benjy Egel, Here’s the String of Crimes Tied to the East Area Rapist in Years of California Terror,
SACRAMENTO BEE, https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article209788654.html.
32. Jouvenal, supra note 30.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. How a Genealogist Helped Police Crack an Infamous 30-year-old Cold Case, CBS NEWS (July 17,
2018, 7:35 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/april-tinsley-murder-police-crack-cold-case-with-cuttingedge-genealogy.
38. Gearty, supra note 4.
39. Id.
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2018, a man was arrested in Utah after FGGS pinned him as the perpetrator of a
rape he committed a few months prior.40
In most of the recent high-profile FGGS cases, investigators conducted
their familial search through GEDmatch rather than through a commercial
database.41 GEDmatch offers tools that 23andMe and Ancestry do not, including
the ability to match based on only one particular segment of DNA.42 Also, since
GEDmatch contains DNA profiles from both Ancestry and 23andMe, as well as
other commercial databases, it can find matches from across their respective user
bases.43 These qualities, along with GEDmatch’s relatively more FGGS-friendly
policy,44 are probably why law enforcement prefers to use GEDmatch over
23andMe or Ancestry, despite GEDmatch’s comparatively smaller database.
2.

Current Restrictions on FGGS

The practice of FGGS, despite its novelty, is already restricted in several
ways. For the federal government, FGGS is restricted by the Department of
Justice’s interim policy.45 On the state side, an increasing number of states have
enacted their own restrictions on familial searching, including outright bans.46
Additionally, for both state and federal actors, FGGS is restricted by the privacy
policies of civilian databases. 47
On September 2, 2019, the Department of Justice approved an interim
policy on FGGS that went into effect on November 11 of the same year.48 The
policy restricts the use of FGGS to three scenarios. First, it may be used if the
government possesses a forensic DNA sample from the putative perpetrator of
an unsolved violent crime.49 Second, it may be used if the case involves the
unidentified remains of a suspected homicide victim.50 Third, it may be
authorized by the prosecutor when there is a “substantial and ongoing threat to
public safety or national security.”51

40. Antonio Regalado, Genetic Genealogy is Now Solving Recent Crimes, Not Just Cold Cases, MIT TECH.
REV. (July 30, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/f/611748/genetic-genealogy-is-now-solving-recentcrimes-not-just-cold-cases.
41. Gearty, supra note 4; see also Sarah Zhang, how a Genealogy Website Led to the Alleged Golden
State Killer, ATLANTIC (Apr. 27, 2018, 12:45 PM),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/04/golden-state-killer-east-area-rapist-dnagenealogy/559070/ (investigators uploaded the Golden State Killer’s DNA to Ancestry at one point during
their search, but no useful lead was found).
42. Zhang, supra note 41.
43. Id.
44. See infra Part I.A.2.
45. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 5, at 1.
46. Combined DNA Index System, supra note 25.
47. See infra p. 1725.
48. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 5, at 1.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 5.
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In these three scenarios, before the FBI or other agencies can use FGGS,
they must first have failed to find a match in CODIS.52 They are also required to
consider other “reasonable scientific alternatives.”53 Only after consulting a
laboratory official on such alternatives and after the prosecutor and agency agree
that FGGS is a “necessary and appropriate” step, may they proceed with the
FGGS process.54
The policy requires agencies to identify themselves as law enforcement to
the civilian database and to only use databases that notify users of the possibility
of law enforcement use in criminal investigations.55 If the government needs to
collect the DNA of a non-suspect, it must do so with informed consent.56
However, if a formal request were to “compromise the integrity of the
investigation,” it may instead collect the DNA covertly so long as it obtains a
search warrant before sending the sample to a vender laboratory.57 A suspect
should not be arrested on the sole basis of a genetic association.58
The policy also lays out rules for handling the DNA data itself. Such data
must be treated as confidential government information.59 When a suspect is
arrested after their genetic information has been sent to a third party, the
government must request all of the suspect’s data be removed from the database
and returned to the government.60 If no arrest occurs, or if an arrest occurs and
after a judicial order is entered, the government may then destroy all related
genetic records.61 Throughout the process, the suspect’s DNA data must only be
used for identification purposes and not to learn the genetic traits of the
suspect.62
The FBI does not purport to regulate familial searching at the state level,
leaving it to the states’ discretion.63 Maryland and the District of Columbia have
enacted laws to prohibit all familial searching.64 For those states that do perform
52. Id. (the term “reasonable scientific alternatives” is not defined in the document).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 5–6.
55. Id. at 6. (all of the notable civilian databases currently include such a notification in their terms of
service); see also Terms and Conditions (US), ANCESTRY (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/
health-terms (last visited July 31, 2021); Terms of Service, 23ANDME (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.23andme.com/about/tos (last visited July 31, 2021); Terms and Service and Privacy Policy,
GEDMATCH (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.gedmatch.com/terms-of-service-privacy-policy (last visited July 31,
2021).
56. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 5, at 6.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 7.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 8.
62. Id. at 4, 6–7.
63. Combined DNA Index System, supra note 25.
64. Id.; MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-506(d) (West 2009) (prohibiting all “person[s]” from
conducting familial searching); D.C. CODE § 22-4151(b) (2009) (prohibiting familial searching using DNA
collected by a state agency).
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familial searching, their regulations vary.65 Nonetheless, there are common
elements among the various statutes; for example, they all have restrictions on
what kinds of crimes can be investigated using familial searching.66
The two largest commercial databases, Ancestry and 23andMe, both
oppose FGGS. Ancestry’s privacy statement declares, “Ancestry does not
voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement.”67 Ancestry’s Terms and
Conditions (US) require that any DNA submitted must be either the user’s own
DNA or the DNA of someone for whom the user is a legal guardian, without
exception.68 23andMe’s Terms of Service likewise require that the user submit
only their own DNA or that of a dependent.69
Despite these assurances, it may be that commercial databases are less
resistant to law enforcement activity than their policies would suggest.70 For
example, in 2019 the company FamilyTreeDNA was revealed to have been
voluntarily disclosing its users’ information to the FBI, despite its stated policy
that it would not do so.71 Moreover, provisions against uploading another
person’s DNA may be toothless because commercial databases have no means
of actually preventing such a practice.72
GEDmatch’s policy markedly differs from those of the large commercial
databases. Unlike 23andMe and Ancestry, GEDmatch allows for the uploading
of another person’s data by law enforcement in cases of murder, nonnegligent
manslaughter, aggravated rape, robbery, or aggravated assault, or to identify a
dead body.73 Elsewhere in its policy, GEDmatch stresses a second time that a
user’s data may be used in familial searching by law enforcement.74 To be sure,
a user must “opt in” to have their data be viewable by users who identify
themselves as law enforcement.75 However, GEDmatch has previously allowed
Florida law enforcement, under warrant, to conduct FGGS using its entire
database.76
65. See Nieto, supra note 6, at 1772.
66. See id. at 1776–77.
67. Your Privacy, ANCESTRY (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement (last
visited July 31, 2021).
68. ANCESTRY, supra note 55.
69. 23ANDME, supra note 55.
70. Katelyn N. Ringrose, Note, A Cautionary Note: Genealogy Companies Need to Stop Giving
Warrantless DNA Clues to Law Enforcement, 124 PENN. STATIM 302, 325 (2019).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 324–25.
73. GEDMATCH, supra note 55.
74. Id. (“For example, some of these possible uses of [data] . . . include but are not limited to . . . familial
searching by third parties . . ..”).
75. Id. Only around 260,000 of GEDmatch’s 1.45 million users have opted in. Alex Wood, DNA,
Genealogy Lead to Arrest in Series of Rapes, J. INQUIRER (June 10, 2020), https://www.journalinquirer.com/
crime_and_courts/dna-genealogy-led-to-arrest-in-series-of-rapes/article_27b25296-ab2d-11ea-8b3e472861ca42e0.html.
76. Kashmir Hill & Heather Murphy, Your DNA Profile is Private? A Florida Judge Just Said Otherwise,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/business/dna-database-search-warrant.html.
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B. CARPENTER AND OTHER CASE LAW
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees against
“unreasonable” searches.77 Courts have generally interpreted “reasonable” to
require a warrant,78 and “search” as an act of the government that infringes either
a property right or a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”79 In
delineating the scope of a “reasonable expectation,” courts have developed the
third-party doctrine, which states that persons have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information they disclose to a third party.80 This doctrine was recently
narrowed by Carpenter v. United States.81
1.

Carpenter v. United States: Limiting the Third-Party Doctrine

Carpenter’s technical background is somewhat complex. In short, every
cellular phone connects to a cellular network several times a minute.82 Each time
the phone connects, the cellular service provider records the approximate
location of the device at the moment of connection.83 The geo-location accuracy
(at the time of the facts of Carpenter) ranged from an eighth of a square mile to
four square miles.84 The provider stores all of these location data, which are
referred to as cell site location information (CSLI).85 As a consequence, cellular
service providers possess information on the location of every cell phone user,
whenever they had their cell phone on their person, for as far back as they retain
the records (up to five years at the time of the decision).86 In Carpenter, police
obtained a court order—but not a warrant—to acquire the defendant’s CSLI that
the provider had acquired over a period of 127 days.87 These data were used as
evidence to link the defendant to a series of robberies.88
The Court began by noting that the case lay at the “intersection” of two
separate lines of precedent.89 The first line of precedent (although less a line than
a single case) consisted of the agreement of a five-justice majority in United
States v. Jones that long-term GPS monitoring of a suspect’s location by the

While the proper scope of an FGGS warrant is a difficult question itself, this Note confines itself to the question
of whether FGGS can be performed without a warrant.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
78. E.g., Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2534 (2019).
79. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405–06 (2012).
80. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
81. Id. at 2217.
82. Id. at 2211.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2218.
85. Id. at 2211–12.
86. Id. at 2218.
87. Id. at 2212. The order was issued under a “reasonable grounds” standard, less exacting than the
“probable cause” standard required for a warrant. Id.
88. Id. at 2212–13.
89. Id. at 2214–15.
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government constituted a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.90 The second
line of precedent was the third-party doctrine, developed in cases such as Smith
v. Maryland and United States v. Miller.91 Miller applied this doctrine to a
person’s bank records, which are retained by the bank, and Smith to the numbers
a person dials on their home phone, which are recorded by the telephone
company.92 Because the defendant’s CSLI was long-term location information
like in Jones, but also automatically disclosed to a third party like the dialed
numbers in Smith, existing precedent was contradictory as to whether CSLI was
protected by the Fourth Amendment.93 A clarifying decision was needed.
The Court settled this conflict by holding that Jones trumped the third-party
doctrine.94 First, the Court observed that CSLI fell neatly under Jones because
it “provides an all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts,” revealing
“movements . . . and . . . associations” and “privacies of life.”95 In fact, CSLI
could be––and was––used to track a person more exhaustively than a GPS
device attached to a car could.96 “A cell phone faithfully follows its owner
beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices,
political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.”97 The Court also
noted that CSLI was continuing to grow more accurate and that the decision
must take account of the cutting edge of technological improvements.98
The Court then turned to the third-party doctrine, noting the doctrine was
never meant to automatically and unconditionally apply whenever a defendant
has shared information with a third party.99 It observed the information that the
government had collected in Smith and Miller was somewhat limited: telephone
numbers, and “negotiable instruments,” respectively.100 The Court reasoned that
“[t]here is a world of difference between the limited types of personal
information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of
location information casually collected by wireless carriers today.”101 The

90. Id. at 2215. In Jones, the Court unanimously held that attaching a tracking device to a car constituted
a Fourth Amendment search. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404, 413. Four justices reached that result using a propertybased analysis, while another four justices used a privacy-based analysis, with Justice Sotomayor endorsing both
approaches. Id. at 404–05, 413–14, 418–19.
91. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), and United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2217.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2218.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2218–19.
99. Id. at 2219.
100. Id. at 2216.
101. Id. at 2219.
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government’s position, therefore, would not be a “straightforward application”
of the third-party doctrine but a “significant extension” of it.102
The Court also noted that cell phone location information “is not truly
‘shared’ as one normally understands the term.”103 Cell phones and the services
they provide are “‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that carrying
one is indispensable to participation in modern society.”104 “[A] cell phone logs
a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part
of the user beyond powering up.”105
The Court stressed that its decision was narrow, did not “disturb the
application of Smith and Miller,” and did not even extend to other possible kinds
of CSLI, let alone other technologies.106 It then confirmed that there was no
applicable exception to the warrant requirement.107
2.

Maryland v. King: When is DNA Unproblematic?

Before this Note turns to Carpenter’s application to FGGS, it is worthwhile
to examine another potentially relevant case. The Supreme Court’s most recent
case dealing with DNA and privacy is Maryland v. King.108 Although King’s
holding does not directly bear upon the issue of FGGS, it is helpful on some
points.
The defendant in King was convicted of rape based on a DNA match.109
When he was arrested for an unrelated crime, officers collected his DNA by
swabbing the inside of his cheek.110 When they checked the DNA against
CODIS, they discovered a match with the earlier rape.111 The defendant was
subsequently charged and found guilty of the rape, and later challenged the
constitutionality of the swab.112 The Maryland state statute authorizing the swab
only allowed swabs of persons in custody for a serious offense supported by
probable cause.113
The Court held that since the swab involved an unwanted trespass on the
defendant’s person, the Fourth Amendment applied.114 The Court then weighed
the government’s interests in performing the swabs against the privacy interest

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 2220.
Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 384 (2014)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2221.
569 U.S. 435 (2013).
Id. at 440.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 446.
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implicated.115 The swabs served the important governmental purpose of
identifying the arrested person and formed part of the booking process.116 In this
respect, they were no different from the use of mugshots or fingerprinting.117
The Court also noted the importance of DNA identification in absolving
innocent suspects.118
The Court then reviewed the history of using new developments in forensic
science to identify suspects and reasoned that DNA was one more step
forward.119 DNA was an even better form of identification than the last great
forensic innovation—fingerprinting—because while facial features and even
fingerprints can be changed, DNA typically cannot.120
Turning to the privacy interests, the Court held that the minimal intrusion
of a cheek swab did not outweigh the immense value of DNA identification.121
Moving on to the separate issue of the CODIS processing, the Court held that it
was not unconstitutional for three reasons.122 First, CODIS uses sections of DNA
that do not reveal the genetic traits of the person from whom the DNA
originates.123 Second, the DNA in CODIS is analyzed only to generate a unique
identity, not to determine genetic traits.124 Third, the authorizing statute
contained provisions against using DNA for any purpose other than
identification.125
Ultimately, Maryland v. King is too narrow to be helpful in illuminating
the question here.126 This is because, unlike CODIS, the DNA samples used in
civilian databases can be used to determine genetic traits.127 While the opinion
does mention that the statute at issue forbade familial searching, it does so only
in passing.128 The main point to take from King is that “a statutory or regulatory
duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures’ generally allays . . . privacy
concerns.”129

115.
116.
117.
118.
(2000)).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 447.
Id. at 451–52.
Id.
Id. at 455–56 (quoting JIM DWYER PETER NEUFELD, & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 245
Id. at 456–59.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 464.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 465.
Dery, supra note 6, at 6.
See 23ANDME, supra note 9.
Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. at 444.
Id. at 465 (quoting Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 155 (2011)).
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II. THE APPLICATION OF CARPENTER TO FGGS
Strictly speaking, Carpenter has no effect on FGGS one way or another
because Carpenter was a narrow holding about cell site data,130 and DNA is not
cell site data.131 But the broader rationale underlying the specific details of
Carpenter—namely, that the third-party doctrine is limited by certain
considerations—raises questions. Several commentators have considered the
possible application of Carpenter’s rationale to FGGS, and they have routinely,
if not uniformly, suggested that it should indeed apply.132 But a closer reading
of Carpenter reveals that DNA is not so easily analogized.
A. DISTINGUISHING CARPENTER DOCTRINALLY
The DNA involved in a familial search is distinguishable from CSLI in two
important ways. First, users of civilian databases willingly and deliberately share
their DNA, and second, DNA does not reveal a person’s actions. Moreover, law
enforcement does not access users’ DNA information directly when it conducts
FGGS.133
1.

Users Voluntarily Share Their DNA With Civilian Databases

Since its inception, the third-party doctrine has required that the individual
have voluntarily disclosed the disputed information to the third party.134 In
Carpenter, the Court noted that CSLI was not really “shared” for the purposes
of the third-party doctrine for two reasons: first, because cell phones are
indispensable devices in modern society; second, because a phone discloses
CSLI “by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the
user.”135
Two recent cases have expounded upon each of these prongs. In United
States v. Hood, the defendant challenged the government’s warrantless
acquisition of his IP address data, arguing that Carpenter applied.136 The First
Circuit disagreed, noting that the defendant had generated the data “only by

130. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
131. In his concurring opinion in Carpenter, Justice Gorsuch mused: “Can the government . . . secure your
DNA from 23andMe without a warrant or probable cause? . . . . [T]hat result strikes most lawyers and judges
today—me included—as pretty unlikely.” Id. at 2262. However, FGGS does not directly secure other users’
DNA. See Lindsey Van Ness, DNA Databases Are Boon to Police but Menace to Privacy, Critics Say, PEW:
STATELINE (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/02/20/
dna-databases-are-boon-to-police-but-menace-to-privacy-critics-say (“Schubert said police don’t get behindthe-scenes, unlimited access to peruse DNA databases, despite what many people believe. Instead, investigators
upload a DNA profile and get a list of matches and partial matches like the average user, she said in an
interview.”).
132. See, e.g., Dery, supra note 6, at 121–28; Ringrose, supra note 69, at 318.
133. See Van Ness, supra note 131.
134. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
135. Id.
136. United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2019).
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making the affirmative decision to access a website or application. By
contrast . . . every time a cell phone receives a call, text message, or email, the
cell phone pings CSLI to the nearest cell site tower without the cell phone user
lifting a finger.”137
In Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, the defendant
city had used “smart meters” to collect detailed energy consumption data from
citizens’ houses.138 The plaintiffs challenged this practice as a violation of their
Fourth Amendment rights.139 On appeal, the defendant argued that the thirdparty doctrine permitted it to collect the data.140 The Seventh Circuit applied
Carpenter, observing that the citizens effectively had no choice but to purchase
electricity from the city, just as people have little choice but to use cell phones.141
FGGS is distinguishable from CSLI on both prongs of this analysis. First,
consider indispensability. Genetic testing is a discretionary service, not an
essential one. It serves the functions of identifying predisposition to certain
diseases, locating a person’s relatives, and allowing a person to learn their
genetic ancestry.142 The last of these serves little more than curiosity. The others
are undoubtedly useful, but they are very far from being as “indispensable to
participation in modern society” as cell phones are.143 Admittedly, technology
ever advances, and it is at least possible that genetic testing will one day be as
ubiquitous as cell phone usage. But that is by no means certain and does not
affect the analysis of today.144
Second, the disclosure of genetic information to a genetic testing company
is undoubtedly an “affirmative act.” In Miller, the third-party doctrine applied
to information that was merely disclosed “in the ordinary course of business.”145
But for civilian databases, genetic information is the business. The very premise
of a commercial database is that the customer will disclose their genetic
information to the company, which will then be analyzed and presented to the
customer.146 To disclose their genetic information, the customer must purchase
a testing kit, deposit saliva into a tube, and mail the tube to the company’s
laboratory.147 One could hardly imagine a more deliberate disclosure. In this

137. Id. at 92.
138. Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2018).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 527.
141. Id.
142. See generally ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/dna/ (last visited July 31, 2021).
143. Kolenc, supra note 6, at 97–98.
144. Id.
145. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
146. 23ANDME, supra note 9.
147. How Does AncestryDNA Work? An Inside Look at The Process, ANCESTRY,
https://www.ancestry.com/dna/lp/how-does-ancestrydna-work (last visited July 31, 2021). Moreover, open
databases like GEDmatch require the additional step of downloading one’s raw data from a commercial
database, then uploading it to the open database. See GEDMATCH, supra note 55.
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respect, civilian DNA databases fit into the third-party doctrine more neatly than
even the doctrine’s foundational cases.
The Court in Carpenter declined to overrule Smith and Miller, 148 even
though those cases each involved an indispensable aspect of modern life––home
telephone usage and banking, respectively––and each also involved a disclosure
that was only incidental to doing business. 149 Since FGGS involves a nonessential service and a deliberate, affirmative disclosure central to a transaction,
it deals with data that were shared more definitively than in Smith and Miller.
Carpenter, then, cannot restrict FGGS on the ground that it accesses data that
were not “shared.” If the Carpenter rationale were to have any bearing on the
status of FGGS, it would be on account of the nature of the data.
2.

The Nature of DNA Compared with Location Information

In deciding Carpenter, the Court repeatedly emphasized the power of
location information to divulge many intimate details of a person’s life.150 It
commented that the Court in Smith did not foresee the “novel circumstances” of
such a “detailed and comprehensive record of [a] person’s movements.”151
Applying the third-party doctrine would go against “society’s
expectation . . . [that] law enforcement agents and others would not—and
indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every
single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”152 The privacy
interest violated was that “in the whole of [one’s] physical movements.”153
Following Carpenter, the Circuit courts have recognized location
information as deserving of special treatment. In United States v. Hood, the First
Circuit held that Carpenter did not apply to IP address information because that
information was not location information.154 In United States v. Beverly, the
government collected various non-CSLI data related to the defendant’s phone.155
The defendant argued that the data should be suppressed under Carpenter
because they might be used to track his location.156 The Fifth Circuit rejected
this argument because the defendant had no basis for his claim that the data could
be so used.157 “With no showing of that,” said the court, “[the defendant]’s
attempt to force this evidence into Carpenter’s holding is a nonstarter.”158

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
Miller, 425 U.S. at 442; Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
Id. at 2217.
Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)).
Id. at 2219.
920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019).
943 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 233.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 239.
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This granting of a special status to location information fits into a broader
Fourth Amendment trend of protecting information that tends to reveal the
pattern of a person’s day-to-day actions. In Riley v. California, the data stored
on a cell phone were held to be protected in part because they could “form a
revealing montage of the user’s life.”159 Both Riley and Carpenter quote the
same line from Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones: location data can
reveal a person’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.”160 Thus, data that reveals “associations” seems to be afforded
special protection.
Some commentators have suggested that DNA can “map” a person’s
behavior just as CSLI can, indicating that courts should apply the Carpenter
rationale.161 It may be true that DNA can reveal a disposition more inclined
towards particular behavior, but an inclination towards an action is not an action.
DNA cannot reveal anything about a person’s actual actions, conduct, or
character.
Exactly what sorts of information does DNA reveal, then? 23andMe
advertises that its DNA analysis can reveal some physical traits such as eye and
hair color, the shape of some facial features, medical predispositions, and
sensitivity to certain tastes.162 And, of course, it can reveal the genetic
relationships between people.163 Let us examine these types of personal
information one at a time.
First, there is information about a person’s facial features. As personal
information goes, one’s facial features are as far from private as one might
imagine. True, there are growing political and legal concerns about the privacy
implications raised by ever-improving facial recognition technology.164 But
DNA facial reconstruction is inherently limited because facial structure is
affected by factors other than DNA, such as hormonal variation, epigenetics, and
cosmetic alteration.165
Then there is information about a person’s propensity for certain diseases.
This is, in most circumstances, the most private and intimate of the details that
may be revealed by DNA testing. Yet even this information does not actually
159. 573 U.S. 373, 396 (2014).
160. Id.; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
161. See Dery, supra note 6, at 126–28.
162. 23ANDME, supra note 9.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 2019) (facial recognition technology
caused concrete harm to plaintiffs’ privacy interests).
165. Peter Claes, Denise K. Liberton, Katleen Daniels, Kerri Matthes Rosana, Ellen E. Quillen, Laurel N.
Pearson, Brian McEvoy, Marc Bauchet, Arslan A. Zaidi, Wei Yao, Hua Tang, Gregory S. Barsh, Devin M.
Absher, David A. Puts, Jorge Rocha, Sandra Beleza, Rinaldo W. Pereira, Gareth Baynam, Paul Suetens, Dirk
Vandermeulen, Jennifer K. Wagner, James S. Boster & Mark D. Shriver, Modeling 3D Facial Shape from DNA,
PLOS GENETICS 10(3) 1, 10 (2013). When the author received a genetic report from 23andMe, the report
predicted physical and facial traits in terms of probability. Some predictions were inaccurate: the report predicted
a low chance of cheek dimples, which the author in fact has.
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reveal anything about the course of a person’s life; a predisposition for a disease
is not a guarantee.
Finally, there is information about a person’s genetic relatives. This is not
the same thing as information about “familial associations.” People regularly
have important familial relations with no direct genetic relationship, such as
spouses, in-laws, step-relatives, and adoptive families.166 Conversely, everyone
has many genetic relatives whom they have never even met. Indeed, one of the
main purposes of the commercial DNA services is to allow people to learn about
those genetic relatives with whom they currently have no familial
associations.167
Possible future improvements to DNA analysis should also be considered
under a Carpenter analysis. Part of Carpenter’s rationale was that CSLI
technology could only continue to improve in accuracy, making its use even
more invasive into a person’s privacy.168 But no matter how much further DNA
analysis progresses in the future, no matter how detailed it becomes, the
substance of it will not change. Perhaps the list of physical traits identifiable
from DNA will grow longer; perhaps the ability to find a person’s relatives will
increase in range of degrees of removal; perhaps more susceptibilities to disease
will be pinpointed. But no new discovery can change the substantive differences
between genetic information and location information. Even if the day comes
when we can read a person’s DNA as clearly as a book, there will be no chapter
in that book detailing any action or event beyond the moment of that person’s
birth.
3.

Could the Foregoing Analysis be Moot?

The entire privacy analysis in the context of FGGS could be moot for two
reasons. The first reason has to do with the premise of an expectation of privacy.
Thus far, this Note has discussed a person’s privacy interest (or lack thereof) in
their own uploaded DNA. But when a familial search is conducted, the proper
question may not be “what expectation of privacy is there in your DNA?” but
rather “what expectation of privacy is there in a genetic relative’s DNA?”169 The
answer is probably that there is none, because there is probably no societal
expectation of privacy in another person’s body.170 In fact, a would-be plaintiff
may not even have standing to make the argument, for want of a legally
cognizable injury.171
166. See, e.g., Remarriage in the United States, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 10, 2015),
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2015/acs/acs-30.html.
167. 23ANDME, supra note 9 (“Discover people who share your DNA. From close family members to distant
ones, you’ll be amazed by the way your DNA relatives connect you to the world.”).
168. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218–19.
169. Kolenc, supra note 6, at 75–77.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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The second reason has to do with the premise that genetic information will
be revealed to the government by FGGS. Thus far, this Note has discussed DNA
privacy as if FGGS necessitated examining the whole of a person’s genetic data
and all the personal implications thereof. But in fact, FGGS does not involve
examining every detail of a person’s DNA—it only requires a determination of
whether and to what extent it matches other sets of DNA.172 Indeed, the DOJ’s
policy dictates that “personal genetic information [shall not be] transferred,
retrieved, downloaded, or retained by [civilian database] users—including law
enforcement—during the automated search and comparison process.”173 It also
states that “[i]nvestigative agencies shall use biological samples and [FGGS]
profiles only for law enforcement identification purposes . . . . Biological
samples and FGGS profiles shall not be used by investigative agencies, vendor
laboratories, [civilian databases], or others to determine the sample donor’s
genetic predisposition for disease or any other medical condition or
psychological trait.”174
In King, the Supreme Court reiterated its longstanding doctrine that “a
‘statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures’ generally
allays . . . privacy concerns.”175 So long as a policy like the DOJ’s is in place,
the complex DNA data used in FGGS is no more of a tattle-tale than is the noncoding DNA in King. It has become a characterless identifier, like a fingerprint
or an identification number.
B. DISTINGUISHING CARPENTER POLITICALLY
Having completed a survey of the doctrinal issues, the next step is to
examine the practical implications to assess whether FGGS ought to be
doctrinally unrestrained.
With the present surge in the online promulgation of DNA data, there are
serious concerns that a lack of privacy safeguards may lead to a rise in genetic
discrimination.176 True, there is the DOJ’s policy against using DNA data for
any purpose but identification, coupled with the principle (invoked in King) that
a formal duty to avoid disclosure may be sufficient.177 However, while such
safeguards may satisfy on a formalistic level, they may not prove to be so
satisfying on a practical level. After all, our nation’s history is replete with
examples of discrimination in the face of de jure guarantees against

172. See Van Ness, supra note 131.
173. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 5, at 3.
174. Id. at 6–7.
175. King, 569 U.S. at 465.
176. Drew M. Baldwin, Redefining the Third-Party Doctrine: Carpenter’s Effect on DNA Privacy, 108 KY.
L.J. 153, 171 (2019).
177. King, 569 U.S. at 465.
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discrimination.178 However, the risk of genetic discrimination resulting from
FGGS seems to be low, if only because extrapolating medical details is not
necessary to conduct FGGS. Additionally, the fact that investigators have thus
far used GEDmatch, instead of databases with larger user bases and FGGS
prohibitions, suggests that they are willing to respect the policies of civilian
databases. To object to genetic databases because they might conceivably lead
to genetic discrimination, could be compared to objecting to mugshots because
they might lead to discrimination on the basis of color.
What is more, the use of FGGS may have an anti-discriminatory effect
when it comes to race. African Americans are overrepresented in CODIS.179 The
highest-profile murderer brought to light by a familial search of CODIS, Lonnie
Franklin, Jr., is black.180 By contrast, people of Northern European ancestry are
more heavily represented in civilian databases.181 Of the murderers brought to
justice in the recent wave of FGGS-based arrests, most were white.182 Thus,
FGGS may serve to ameliorate the disparate racial impact which would result
from the exclusive use of CODIS.183
Some commentators, while conceding that FGGS is not restricted by the
Fourth Amendment, have called for statutory or executive regulation of FGGS
to prevent abuses that might result from a complete absence of standards.184
Since those articles were written, the DOJ has issued its policy, fulfilling that
regulatory role at the federal level and setting an example for states to follow.
Other writers have raised the possibility of false positives, noting that the
Golden State Killer investigators had to approach several DNA-matching
suspects before they found the culprit.185 But those same investigators were able
to clear the innocent men and confirm the only guilty one by collecting new
DNA samples.186 It is an inevitable part of criminal investigation, so long as its
methods are imperfect and its conductors not omniscient, that innocent citizens

178. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310–15 (1966) (discussing the history of voting
discrimination in spite of constitutional and statutory guarantees of a right to vote).
179. Kim Zetter, DNA Sample from Son Led to Arrest of Accused “Grim Sleeper,” WIRED (July 12, 2010,
7:41 PM), https://www.wired.com/2010/07/dna-database.
180. Id.
181. Antonio Regalado, A DNA Detective Has Used Genealogy to Point Police to Three More Suspected
Murderers, MIT TECH. REV. (June 26, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/f/611548/a-dna-detectivehas-used-genealogy-to-point-police-to-three-more-suspected.
182. Id.
183. Christi J. Guerrini, Jill O. Robinson, Devan Petersen & Amy L. McGuire, Should Police Have Access
to Genetic Genealogy Databases? Capturing the Golden State Killer and Other Criminals Using a Controversial
New Forensic Technique, PLOS BIOLOGY, Oct. 2018, at 1, 5. A survey suggests that support for FGGS among
the general public does not vary significantly based on income or race. Id.
184. E.g., Jamie M. Zeevi, DNA is Different: An Exploration of the Current Inadequacies of Genetic Privacy
Protection in Recreational DNA Databases, 93 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 767, 771–73 (2019).
185. Kolenc, supra note 6, at 54–55.
186. Id.
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will sometimes fall under suspicion. If anything, DNA analysis, because of its
accuracy, is the method least likely to place an innocent person under suspicion.
An example of DNA’s favored status may be gleaned from a comparison
of Riley and King. Both cases involved a search conducted on a person who had
just been arrested, with the accompanying decrease in expectations of privacy.187
In each case, the Court nevertheless held that a privacy interest was
implicated.188 But in Riley, the Court held that the cell phone data were not
valuable enough to justify the intrusion, while in King, the defendant’s DNA and
its ability to act as an identifier was of great enough value to outweigh the
intrusion.189
In King, the Supreme Court lauded the unparalleled power of DNA
databases to reveal the guilty and spare the innocent.190 Yet King dealt only with
government-database, non-familial searching.191 In the years since King, FGGS
has made strides which make the method used in King seem insignificant by
comparison. It has solved one of the most notorious serial murder cases in the
nation’s history.192 It has pinpointed the culprits of crimes as old as thirty years
before, and as recently as two months before.193 The latter cases, in particular,
inspire hope that victims in the future may not have to wait long for justice to be
done, as previous generations have.

III. MOVING FORWARD: PREDICTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
What lies ahead for FGGS? The commercial databases will probably
continue to update their privacy policies, trying to strike a balance between
assuaging their customers’ fears and maximizing the extent to which they can
profit from their customers’ data. Perhaps they will keep to their present privacy
pledges, and perhaps not. Either way, it will be of little importance for FGGS,
because most or all FGGS will not be conducted through them but through
GEDmatch due to that site’s significant advantages.
The final version of the DOJ’s policy was originally planned to be issued
sometime in 2020.194 At the time of this Note’s publication, the final policy has
not been released or a new date set. What changes will the final version make,
and how will it be implemented in practice? Such speculation lies beyond this
Note, but to the extent that the policy’s provisions do not significantly deviate
from those of the interim version, they will probably satisfy the requirements of
Fourth Amendment law and the associated practical concerns.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Riley, 573 U.S. at 391–92; King, 569 U.S. at 463.
Riley, 573 U.S. at 403; King, 569 U.S. at 446.
Riley, 573 U.S. at 403; King, 569 U.S. at 465.
King, 569 U.S. at 460–61.
Id. at 441.
Jouvenal, supra note 30.
Regalado, supra note 40; CBS NEWS, supra note 37.
DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 22.
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Putting official policy aside, it is unlikely FGGS will be used to investigate
any crimes other than serious violent crimes. The time, effort, and resources
FGGS can require seem to preclude such a broadened use.195 The policies of the
DOJ and GEDmatch both restrict the use of FGGS to violent crimes and a few
other exigencies.196 This comports with popular opinion: at least one study
suggests that the public is much more open to the use of FGGS in violent crime
cases.197
Concerns about genetic privacy and discrimination should not be
discounted. As technology advances, the law sometimes struggles to keep up,
and genetics is no exception. For example, there are gaps in the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act regarding discrimination on the basis of
genetics that need to be statutorily addressed.198 However, that is outside the
responsibility of those who perform FGGS. Their part is to ensure they do not
collect information on the more sensitive details revealed by DNA, and merely
identify the similarities between DNA profiles.
Considering the potential value of FGGS, states that have banned familial
searching should consider lifting their bans. States that do not currently practice
familial searching should consider doing so. States that practice familial
searching should ensure they have sensible regulations to satisfy Maryland v.
King.
All three groups can look to the Department of Justice’s policy as an
example. In particular, there are two provisions within that policy that assuage
popular concerns without compromising the effectiveness of FGGS. First, the
policy’s restriction of FGGS to violent crimes (and other exigencies) brings it in
line with public opinion.199 Second, its prohibition of using a suspect’s DNA to
learn their genetic traits is a way of averting the problem of genetic
discrimination.
Although public opinion of FGGS seems to be cautiously optimistic, more
could be done to educate the public on the differences between familial
searching and the traditional government subpoena of data.200 The increasing
amount of governmental data surveillance is a growing concern among

195. See Jouvenal, supra note 30 (Golden State Killer FGGS required piecing together twenty-five family
trees containing thousands of people, a process taking months).
196. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 5, at 4–5; GEDMATCH, supra note 55.
197. Guerrini et al., supra note 183, at 3.
198. Baldwin, supra note 176, at 173–75.
199. Guerrini et al., supra note 178, at 3.
200. In a survey, only 48% of respondents approved of “DNA testing companies sharing their customers’
genetic data with law enforcement agencies in order to help solve crimes.” Andrew Perrin, About Half of
Americans are OK with DNA Testing Companies Sharing User Data with Law Enforcement, PEW RESEARCH
CTR.: FACT TANK (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/04/about-half-of-americansare-ok-with-dna-testing-companies-sharing-user-data-with-law-enforcement. But FGGS does not involve the
sharing of users’ data. See Van Ness, supra note 131.
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Americans.201 But familial searching does not implicate the same concerns.
Since it involves posing as a user, the government cannot uncover any
information about a person that they have not already made available to other
users. The point should also be emphasized that FGGS is no more a risk to
privacy than CODIS familial searching.202
On the civilian side, commercial databases like 23andMe and Ancestry
should consider revising their privacy policies, because familial searching does
not threaten the privacy of those sites’ users any more than other users do.203 An
opt-in provision, like the one used by GEDmatch, would allow these databases
to contribute to FGGS while still respecting the wishes of their users. 23andMe,
it should be noted, already encourages its users to volunteer their DNA data for
scientific research.204 A similar volunteer system for law enforcement purposes
should not seem out of the question. Finally, the author would encourage his
readers who have used 23andMe or another commercial service to consider
uploading their data to an open database such as GEDmatch. Increasing the size
and scope of such a database serves the public interest without disclosing any
more information than you already have.

CONCLUSION
FGGS is a powerful new forensic tool that has already, in its brief
existence, put many infamous criminals behind bars. It is not a “search” subject
to the usual warrant requirement under the Carpenter decision because DNA
information, unlike location information, cannot reveal anything about a
person’s actions or the circumstances of their life. Furthermore, there exist
regulatory duties to safeguard any personal information DNA could reveal.
Because of FGGS’s extreme usefulness to society and its relative lack of privacy
implications, its use should be encouraged in law and policy.

201. E.g., Brooke Auxier, Lee Rainie, Monica Andersen, Andrew Perrin, Madhu Kumar & Erica Turner,
Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of Control Over Their Personal Information,
PEW RESEARCH CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/
americans-and-privacy-concerned-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information.
202. One recent survey suggested that the general public is more concerned about familial searching when
it uses civilian databases than when it uses government databases. See James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin,
“A World of Difference”? Law Enforcement, Genetic Data, and the Fourth Amendment, 70 DUKE L.J. 705, 749
(2021) (summarizing results).
203. See supra Part II.B.
204. Research, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/research.

1740

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

***

[Vol. 72:1717

